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 2 
Introduction 
 
“The War in 1982 is the worst thing that could have happened to us”. That is a sentence 
often heard when speaking to Argentinians about the Malvinas issue. Not just because they 
lost the War and 600 unprepared boys with it, but because in a short period of time their 
sovereignty claim on the archipelago in the South Atlantic became completely worthless. In 
that sense they were their own worst enemy. After the War, with the resurrection of 
democracy in Argentina, succeeding governments have tried to slowly restore diplomatic 
and economic ties with the United Kingdom. Although the sovereignty claim on the Malvinas 
remained part of the Argentinian Constitution, the governments that came after the War did 
not follow-up on this provision very pro-actively. Especially Carlos Menem’s administration 
(1989-1999) was focussed on promoting the economic relationship between Argentina and 
the UK. This all changed with the election of Néstor Kirchner in 2003. 
  
In November 2018, I was sitting in a cab somewhere 1300 kilometres south of Buenos Aires 
in a small town called Puerto Madryn in the province of Chubut. The rear window of the cab 
was covered with a big sticker that shouted: “Las Malvinas son argentinas”. When I asked 
the cab driver why she had that prominent sticker on her window, she replied that this was 
the municipality who obliged them to have this sticker on their cars. This experience in small 
town, 1500 kilometres away from the Malvinas, meant for me the starting point of my 
investigation into what the Malvinas mean for Argentinians, what role it has played in 
Argentinian politics, but more specifically, how and why the Kirchner administrations (2003-
2015) reinvigorated the claim on the sovereignty of the islands in the South Atlantic. As 
Néstor Kirchner and his successor Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2015) often have 
been associated with populism, I want to find out how an active pursuance of the Malvinas 
claim fits into the populist agenda of the Kirchners. 
 
Néstor Kirchner was the first president after the War (2003-2007) to actively claim the 
Malvinas, halting a long period of demalvinization of Argentinian politics. His wife, Cristina 
Fernández  was even more radical in her efforts of diplomatically confronting the British. 
She was very active in trying to find regional and multilateral support for the bilateral 
dispute. Also domestically Cristina turned many stones.  
 3 
She appointed a special secretary for Malvinas issues, she founded a Malvinas museum in 
Buenos Aires, she empowered the Centre for Malvinas Veterans (CECIM La Plata) and gave 
the veterans the status of hero instead of victim. In order to find out why the Kirchners did 
all of this, it is necessary to decompose their background and their political ideology, which 
they came to call Kirchnerism. 
 
This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter is a theoretical exploration of 
three concepts that play a crucial role in the politics of the Kirchners: national sovereignty, 
populism and resource nationalism. I have taken a step back to see the broader Latin 
American or global context of these concepts and I have assessed the conceptual debates 
that previous authors and renowned academics have exhibited. For instance, René Antonio 
Mayorga and Kurt Weyland have made enlightening contributions to the discussion about 
the role and development of (neo)populism in Latin America. I want to see how their vision 
and those of others are applicable to the political style of the Kirchners. The second chapter 
provides the Argentinian historical and political context starting after the Malvinas War in 
1982. It describes the neoliberal administration of fellow Peronist Carlos Menem (1989-
1999) and his neoliberal successors, to contrast later with the interventionistic policies of the 
Kirchners. I elaborate on the political ideology of Kirchnerism, being a side-branch of 
Peronism, just like Menemism, but with very different characteristics. The third chapter 
combines the previous two chapters and my own research in order to analyse the specific 
case at hand.  
 
My analysis is based on field research I have conducted in Argentina combined with a 
thorough literature study. In 2018, I stayed in Buenos Aires for two months where I started 
in a bookshop and ended up amidst the inner circle of Kirchnerists. It was through the 
bookshop Libros del Pasaje, where I spent many hours, that I found the names and contact 
details of most of the experts related to either Kirchnerism or the Malvinas. One of them, 
Sonia Winer, is a sociologist at the UBA, expert on the Malvinas issue and strong advocate 
for Kirchnerism. She proved to be a tireless source of information as well as a stepping stone 
into the network of Kirchnerist politicians, scholars and veterans of the Malvinas War.  
Winer invited me to several events, with the most remarkable being a discussion on the 
sovereignty related to the Malvinas issue in the Chamber of Deputies.  
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I sat in a small room and listened to verbal contributions by several well-known Argentinians, 
such as Adolfo Pérez Esquivel (1980 Nobel Peace Prize Winner), Fernando Solanas (film 
director and now senator), Daniel Filmus (Secretary for Malvinas Matters), Alicia Castro 
(between 2012 and 2016 Argentina’s ambassador to the UK), Ricardo Alfonsín (2011 
presidential candidate), including several other politicians and Malvinas veterans. Most of 
them were worried about the renewed signs of friendship between the UK and Argentina 
under Macri. Also they viewed the upcoming Brexit as an opportunity for renegotiating the 
sovereignty of the Malvinas.  
 
During these two months in Argentina I visited the Malvinas Museum, founded by Cristina 
Fernández, where I interviewed Mario Volpe, the former director of the Museum and 
veteran of the Malvinas War. Besides that, I travelled twice to the city of La Plata, to the 
south of Buenos Aires. There I met with Alejandro Simonoff, a professor in International 
Relations at the UNLP specialized in the Malvinas issue. He spoke about ‘la nación 
amputada’ in relation to the Malvinas case. In La Plata I also joined a manifestation at Centre 
for Malvinas Veterans (CECIM) to commemorate the 36th anniversary of the War and to 
inaugurate their new headquarters. In order to get different views and a balanced opinion I 
also conducted interviews with academics who were somewhat more neutral or even critical 
of the Kirchner administrations. What I have noticed among most of the Argentinians I spoke 
with is that they have a sense that the Malvinas are part of their national identity. I have 
tried to compress all of the information I have received, during my field research and 
afterwards during the literature studies, into my own analysis of the Malvinas issue under 
the Kirchner administrations. Unfortunately Cristina Fernández never responded to my 
interview request. In 2018 she was still a senator for Frente para la Victoria and since 
December 2019 she is Argentina’s vice-president.   
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Chapter 1 
National Sovereignty, Populism and Resource Nationalism 
  
This chapter provides a theoretical framework for a better understanding of the Malvinas 
dispute and the reason for which the Kirchner presidents reinvigorated the claim on the 
Islands. By highlighting the discussions regarding relevant concepts such as sovereignty, 
populism and resource nationalism, this chapter establishes the theoretical fundament of 
the thesis. This first paragraph starts off with discussing what sovereignty in a theoretical 
sense entails in order to find out what it means for the Kirchners. Then I will use the concept 
of sovereignty as a stepping stone to take a broader look at populism in a Latin American 
context. In my eyes both concepts are closely intertwined and play a significant role in the 
politics of the Kirchners. The second paragraph elaborates on the concept of Latin American 
nationalism and the different forms in which it may appear. One of the forms I will take a 
closer look at is nationalism related to the state management of resources.  
 
1.1 National Sovereignty and Populism in Latin America 
 
‘It is an injustice how in the 21st century there still subsist a colonialist enclave a few hundred 
kilometres from our shores...it is totally absurd when pretending dominion over a territory 
that’s more than 14.000 kilometres away from them.’ – Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, 
Ushuaia, 2012 (Dodds, 2012, p. 684). 
 
In countless discourses Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández have claimed that the islands 
in the South Atlantic are part of Argentinian territory. Both domestically as well as 
externally, they repeatedly stated that the United Kingdom is trespassing Argentina’s 
national sovereignty.  
 
Latin America has a long history in the juridical tradition of preserving national sovereignty, 
and also in the devising of special mechanisms to defend and enforce it, either in the 
domestic sphere, or through international law. The notion of national sovereignty is as old as 
the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 (Almeida, 2013, p. 472). 
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Ever since, the concept has been developing and has been consolidated by the UN Charter 
(1945), ‘which despite its alleged coverage of the “peoples of the United Nations”, is entirely 
respectful of the rights of its member states, which are totally sovereign in matters of 
internal politics’ (Almeida, 2013, p. 472). 
 
As Almeida points out, the Charter made national sovereignty part of international law. 
However, it was not reassuring former colonies who remember the imperialist tendencies of 
big colonial powers throughout the ages. Almeida links the lack of regional economic 
integration to the fear of losing national sovereignty. ‘This is perhaps one of the reasons why 
it constituted a main tenet of the juridical thinking developed in Latin America since the 
early 19th century. Threats of European intervention after the new independence of the 
Iberian American States, British economy hegemony over the entire continent and its 
meddling in political conflicts on many political occasions, and the rise of the United States 
as a dominant power at the end of that century, are factors that explain the development by 
Latin American jurists of new concepts arising from the old Westphalia principle. The strict 
adherence to national sovereignty was one of them, to be enshrined in a “juridical theology” 
which is responsible, in most cases, for the slow march of various schemes of regional 
integration in the continent’ (Almeida, 2013, p. 473). 
 
Nevertheless, Latin American countries are sometimes trying to achieve more regional 
cooperation. Throughout the years several supranational projects were started, such as 
MERCOSUR, ALBA, CELAC or UNASUR, but these projects are being endangered, not only by 
the fear of losing autonomy, but mostly by the inability of Latin American countries to 
uphold their own promises for more ambitious regional cooperation plans. ‘In fact, every 
agreement in Latin America is comprehensive, all encompassing, pervasive,  .. and not 
feasible’ (Almeida, 2013, p. 488). 
 
Thomas Legler, in his article ‘Post-hegemonic Regionalism and Sovereignty in Latin America’ 
(2013), decomposes the concept of national sovereignty in three parts: that of the 
sovereign; territory or space and authority. ‘Taken together in different empirical 
constellations they constitute distinct sovereignty regimes’ (Legler, 2013, p. 328). 
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He paraphrases Hinsley in order to give a definition of the concept: ‘Sovereignty is the 
absolute authority of a sovereign within a given political community or territory.’  He 
questions this definition on the point where it mentions ‘absolute authority’.  
In his opinion, absolute authority of a sovereign over a certain territory is impossible. There 
is an ongoing debate on the question what the effects are of globalization on the 
governmental authority over their marked territories. ‘The problems that many countries in 
the global South confront establishing their domestic authority while paradoxically enjoying 
external sovereignty in the interstate system has led to a phenomenon which Robert Jackson 
(1993) once described as “quasi-states” (Legler, 2013, p. 331).’ 
  
Legler also highlights a contrasting division in the debate between the skeptics and the 
optimists. Almeida would fit into the group of what Thomas Legler calls the skeptics, when it 
comes to the scholarly debate on the regionalist analysis.  ‘Optimists essentially argue that 
recent changes in regionalism, from the open, U.S.- dominated regionalism of the 1990s to 
post-liberal, post-neoliberal, or post-hegemonic regionalism in the new millennium, are 
having a transformative impact on sovereignty’ (Legler, 2013, p. 327). 
 
They suggest that a new sovereignty regime is emerging, particularly in South America, 
which goes beyond national sovereignty, is linked to the construction of a regional polity, 
and in which sovereign authority is vested not only in the heads of state and government but 
also in intergovernmental organizations, transnational civil society, and citizens (Legler, 
2013, p. 327). Skeptics recognize the attempts for regional cooperation, but they do not see 
those projects succeeding because of the persistent fear or losing control over the national 
sovereignty. In fact, they say that the upcoming regionalism only reinforced national 
sovereignty and enhanced mainly presidential authority. 
 
Both the skeptics and the optimists come together on some points related to the 
sovereignty implications of recent regional trends. For example, there is a general consensus 
in the literature that current Latin American regional construction builds on a strong 
tradition of defensive multilateralism and defensive regionalism and that U.S. influence in 
the Latin American countries has been reduced. However, what both the skeptics and the 
optimists fail to mention, is what Legler calls the dual spatial autonomy.  
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This means that national sovereignty is interwoven with and mutually reinforced by regional 
sovereignty. Sovereign authority at the domestic level within Latin American states is 
enhanced and protected by the creation of a regional shield against both extra-regional 
market forces and U.S. power (Legler, 2013, p. 328).  And as we shall see later on in this 
thesis, that not only counts for U.S. power but also for the power of Great Britain.  
 
More in general, Argentina’s foreign policy has been swinging like a pendulum from more 
international integration to more autonomy. The former being influenced by the theory of 
peripheral realism, that was established in the 1990s in Buenos Aires and directly influenced 
Carlos Menem’s external affairs. Carlos Escudé’s theory of peripheral realism looks at the 
costs and benefits of international cooperation and it comes to the conclusion that the path 
of isolationism in the end is less profitable for a country than to seek integration with the 
First World countries. Escudé states that, given the subordinate position in the international 
world order, Argentina should seek alliances with the United States as well as other 
countries in the top of the international pyramid, in order to obtain economic prosperity 
(Del Pezzo, 2016, p. 125).  
 
The Kirchners strongly disagree with Escudé’s theory and they have always looked for 
regional cooperation combined with a focus on autonomy and self-proficiency. Also 
Alejandro Simonoff (2003) finds Escudé’s conclusions too weak: ‘The problem with Escudé’s 
theory is that the profits of this system will always remain eventual or shies away from a 
confrontation in the future, eternalizing the current path’ (Simonoff, 2003, p. 11). The focus 
on autonomy and self-proficiency comes from the notion made by Juan Carlos Puig who 
believed that First World countries profit from the system as it is, where they are the Centre 
that has the power to exploit the peripheral countries by importing cheap basic resources 
and selling exporting back expensive end-products. That is why Puig states that peripheral 
countries should work their way up in the international pyramid by becoming independent 
from First World investments (Del Pezzo, 2016, p. 125). Ever since the 1990s Argentina has 
been switching from external relations based on Escudé’s theory of peripheral realism and to 
the opposite side, to Puig’s concept of autonomism.  
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The rise of populism in the 21st century can also be seen as a response to globalization. In 
Latin America and around the world, populists respond to the fears of civilians who see their 
local community being incorporated into the global village. ‘Let’s take back control’ is an 
often-used sentence in populist’ rhetoric. In a historical survey of the concept of sovereignty 
made by Hinsley, he found that articulations of sovereignty tend to be more pronounced 
and widespread when ‘conditions have been producing rapid changes in the scope of 
government or in the nature of society or both’ (Kallis, 2018, p. 293). 
 
Taking back control is not only about combatting globalization or creating a perception of 
effective sovereigntism. Aristotle Kallis links the contemporary rise of populism to a new 
form of sovereigntism that crosses conventional political lines and extends beyond any 
particular sphere or institution. He focusses on the locus of the performance of sovereignty. 
‘Staging emotive spectacles of reclaimed sovereign power is an essential facet of the 
populist strategy that seeks to juxtapose such performances of a re-empowered demos to 
the alternative of a profound systemic crisis that threatened the very security and welfare of 
the people’ (Kallis, 2018, p. 294). An antidote to this crisis proved to be the 
reterritorialization of power with a line of defense, provided by populists, that underlined 
the danger ‘outside’ and reconstituted popular sovereignty ‘inside’. A tactic that was also 
used by the Kirchners. They staged an emotive spectacle by claiming sovereignty of the 
Falklands and by creating an external danger, being the presence of a NATO military base on 
the Islands, they reconstituted popular sovereignty internally.  
 
Robert Barr (2017) showcases three waves of populism in Latin America. According to him, 
populism first appeared in the aftermath of the Great Depression, with the collapse of the 
export-led economic model. These populist leaders promised political inclusion and 
economic gains for the descamisados, to use the word of Perón. Most of these populists 
became very popular. These leaders drew support from millions of people, partially because 
of the success of the import substitution industrialization (ISI) policies. After democracy 
returned in the beginning of the 1990s, we notice a new surge of populists in Latin America.  
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These new populists, or neopopulists, embraced neoliberal market reforms, reducing the 
state interference and its protection of the lower classes. In opposition to the neoliberal 
policies, a new populist movement arose at the beginning of the century, that aligned itself 
with the radical left.  
 
Kurt Weyland is one of the most thorough authors when it comes to elaborating the concept 
of populism in Latin America. He defines populism ‘as a political strategy through which a 
personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, 
uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers’ (Weyland, 
2001, p. 5). He distinguishes three kinds of conceptualization: cumulative, radical and 
classical conceptualization. According to Weyland, the traditional approach to Latin 
American populism has been the cumulative one, that used several attributes from different 
domains. From the 1960s till the 1980s most authors consequently used the cumulative 
concept of populism. They tried to understand the rise of populists between the 1930s and 
the 1960s.   
 
The cumulative concept connects populist politics to its social roots, its socioeconomic 
background and substantive policies. It mainly focusses on the expansionary economics 
programme and redistributive measures. Most authors also noted a personalistic style of 
political leadership directed at the ‘common’ people. A charismatic individual that wins and 
exercises power by maintaining direct contact with a largely unorganized mass of followers. 
These cumulative authors linked the rapid advance of industrialization, urbanization and 
education to the growth of a mass participation, that started to undermine the traditional 
political authority.  This is what they saw as the birthplace of populism in Latin America 
(Weyland, 2001, p. 5).  
 
The cumulative concept had a long predominance. The military dictatorships of the 1960s 
and 1970s sought to eradicate this kind of populism, meaning the organization instability, 
economic irresponsibility and excessive distributive generosity that it brought about. 
However, in the new democracies that emerged from the 1980s, populist leaders 
reappeared as well (Weyland, 2001, p. 6).  
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Although they also drew their support from large unorganized masses, they were different 
from the classical populists. This posed a conceptual problem. As he states: 
‘Most important, the growing divergence of populist political strategies and the 
socioeconomic strategies of classical populism called into question the prevailing cumulative 
definitions. In fact, none of the new leaders displayed all the defining characteristics 
stipulated by the cumulative notions’ (Weyland, 2001, p. 7). In the new political and 
socioeconomic setting, it became difficult to nominate the new populists according to the 
cumulative concept, to a specific socioeconomic setting. Where Carlos Menem is a good 
example of a populism ‘new style’, combining neoliberal reforms with a populist attitude, his 
Kirchner successors are yet again examples of the classical cumulative populists. That is why 
this thesis will stick to discussing a more classical notion of populism.   
 
Another authority when it comes to elaborating the concept of populism is the Argentinian 
political scientist Ernesto Laclau. Most authors that worked on this theme after Laclau refer 
back to his work On Populist Reason (2005). In his opening chapter, he reaffirms the 
difficulties that populism as a concept poses. Laclau states that populism is a frequently used 
concept, applied to a lot of different political movements.  An often-seen feature of the 
literature on populism is its difficulty to give the concept a precise meaning (Laclau, 2005, p. 
25). Especially the authors that have based their work on the classical populism of the 60s 
and 70s have difficulties to find exact words to describe this phenomenon.  
 
This also shows Gino Germani in his book Authoritarianism, Fascism and National Populism 
(1978). ‘Populism itself tends to deny any identification with or classification into the 
Right/Left dichotomy. It is a multiclass movement, although not at all multiclass movements 
may be considered populist. Populism probably defies any comprehensive definition 
(Germani, 1978, p. 88). In his opinion, populism often seems contradictory. It claims equality 
of political rights and universal participation of the ‘common’ people, but it is often 
combined with a sort of authoritarianism under charismatic leadership.  Populism includes a 
demand for social justice, defense of small property, strong nationalist components, and the 
denial of the importance of class. It is anti-elitist, usually considered inimical to the people 
and the nation. ‘Any of these elements may be stressed according to cultural and social 
conditions, but they are all present in most populist movements’ (Germani, 1978, p. 88). 
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Luckily the literature of the 21st century provides clearer guidelines. According to René 
Mayorga, the concept of populism has been anchored in four theoretical perspectives: First, 
the historical-sociological perspective, which stresses mobile socialization and sociopolitical 
coalitions arising in the context of the crisis of oligarchic domination, the early stages of 
industrialization, and the transition from a traditional to a modern society. Secondly, the 
economic perspective, which draws attention to populism as a type of redistributive policy 
and state interventionism responding to economic elites’ weaknesses and inability to 
develop class hegemony. Then, the ideological perspective, which identifies populism with a 
specific discourse articulating the constitution of a “popular” actor and the contradiction 
between this actor and the dominant classes. Finally, the political perspective, which 
explains populism as a pattern of mobilization of subaltern and/or excluded masses by 
personalistic leaders that is not based on institutional structures of political mediation 
(Mayorga, 2006, p. 134). 
 
Mayorga makes a distinction between historical populism and neopopulism. He states that, 
unlike the historical populism, neopopulism functions within the democratic system. 
According to him, neopopulists accept the rules of the political competition, but at the same 
time resorts to the legitimacy of the leader, who presents himself as redeemer and 
embodiment of the people and the nation. As an ideology, neopopulism can therefore be 
seen as a pattern of ideological legitimation that functions within the boundaries of the 
representative democracy. It even takes advantage of the resources that representative 
democracy and its electoral mechanisms provide (Mayorga, 2006, p. 135). 
 
The most important difference between neopopulism and classical populism is the 
appearance of what Mayorga calls ‘the outsiders’, by which he means the populists that 
spring up from outside of the established party system. ‘At a first glance, the emergence of 
outsiders seems akin to “thunder in a clear blue sky.” But outsiders become key players 
essentially because of an auspicious context: a crisis of governability and a profound decay 
and breakdown of party systems’ (Mayorga, 2006, p. 136). He blames the existing political 
party systems for not being representative enough in order to satisfy the needs of the 
people.  
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David Doyle also focusses on the idea of political outsiders. He follows a definition of 
populism given by Kenneth Roberts (2007). Populism to Roberts ‘refers to the top-down 
political mobilization of mass constituencies by personalistic leaders who challenge elite 
groups on behalf of the ill-defined pueblo, or “the people”.’ Doyle states that Néstor 
Kirchner was part of new wave of populists that came after the neopopulists (Fujimori, 
Menem etc.). That batch of populists, although not homogeneous, portrayed many elements 
of the main characteristics that are mentioned above. These highly-personalized populist 
movements are all based on relative political outsiders with an anti-systemic and anti-elitist 
discourse (Doyle, 2011, p. 1449).  
 
However, there is a discussion about whether Néstor Kirchner can be categorized as part of 
this new group of the more classical populists that came after the neopopulists. Doyle 
believed he did form part of that group but other authors are more doubtful. For example, 
Hunter and Weyland notice a difference between his candidacy and his presidency. Néstor 
Kirchner was not a very known politician. Therefore he was sometimes qualified as an 
outsider, but he was also a governor of the province of Santa Cruz. For his presidential bid he 
got support from insiders such as Eduardo Duhalde, the sitting president at the time of the 
elections in 2003. Furthermore, Kirchner did campaign against neoliberalism in the classic 
Peronist caudillo-style, but his rhetoric lacked an us-versus-them- tone that is a 
characteristic of other populists. (Barr, 2017, p. 155) Other populists, like his successor and 
wife, Cristina Fernández, who was known for her rhetoric of ‘be with us or be against us’.  
 
Furthermore, the policies and discourse of the Kirchner’s had a strong anti-imperialistic 
character. This was, among other things, reflected in their campaign against the British 
presence on the Malvinas. With anti-imperialism and regionalism comes also the defense of 
national sovereignty. In order to get a better theoretical understanding of this kind of 
populism, it is necessary to elaborate on the meaning of national sovereignty for populists in 
Latin America.  
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Concluding you could say that Latin American populism as a concept is very hard to define. 
The most often-used definition is the one given by Weyland, who saw populism ‘as a political 
strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on 
direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized 
followers.’ (Weyland, 2001, p. 5) Furthermore, authors make a distinction between classical 
populism and neopopulism. Paradoxically, neopopulists are associated with the 
implementation of neoliberal market-reforms in Latin American countries, whereas classical 
populists are associated with redistributive economic measures, social policies and anti-
imperialism, state interventionism and nationalism. Common ground can be found in the 
role of a strong charismatic leader.  On top of that, populism can also be linked to the 
concept of sovereigntism. By promising to take back control over sovereign borders and by 
appointing an external threat, populists often gain support from the people who have seen 
their societies changing by globalization. Finally, Argentina’s external politics since the 1990s 
have been functioning as a pendulum, switching from a focus on international economic 
cooperation and integration towards an emphasis on autonomy and self-proficiency. 
 
1.2 Nationalism and Resources 
 
Nationalism plays a considerable role in populism, but also more specifically in the politics of 
the Kirchner’ administrations. Therefore, it is vital to elaborate on the concept of 
nationalism in a Latin American context by showing how previous academics tried to 
conceptualize nationalism and how they asses the role and impact of nationalism in the Latin 
American region. More recently, during the presidencies of the Kirchners, nationalism is 
linked to state management of national resources, which plays an interesting role in the 
issue of the Malvinas.   
 
One of the oldest and most cited authors on Latin American nationalism is Kalmart Silvert, 
who published an article named ‘Nationalism in Latin America’ (1961). He sets out an 
overview of subdivisions of the many ways in which the word nationalism is used, with 
suggestions for their significance within the Latin American context: The first subdivision is 
nationalism as patriotism. Refers to the love of the country and national community, on the 
one hand, on the other hand the collection of symbols expressing this love.  
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Glorification of the race, military pomp and ceremony on the occasion of national holidays, 
martial anthems, and homage to the symbolic baggage of the nation are celebrated on many 
occasions in Latin America. Secondly, nationalism as social value. Refers to the norm defining 
the loyalty due to fellow citizens and to the secular state as the ultimate arbiter of all 
conflicts of public interest. This aspect of nationalism is the crucial one, for a broad loyalty to 
fellow citizens and a fitting set of functional institutions is the critical social factor 
permitting, in the end, economic development. Here nationalism is defined as a social 
psychological concept with its particular institutional referent, the state. Thirdly, nationalism 
as ideology involves those explicit bodies of thought employing the symbols of nationality in 
order to promote actions intended at least partially to glorify the nation as a good in itself. 
The ideologies of nationalism are the most discussed of all the aspects of the subject, not 
only because of their visibility, but also because they touch on the delicate subjects of 
expropriation, racism, xenophobia, anti-imperialism and political extremism (Silvert, 1961, 
pp. 3-6). 
 
Nationalism can serve two purposes from the point of view of a nation: first, a domestic 
purpose, direct inward, towards the nation’s domestic concerns. And secondly, an external 
purpose, directed outward, towards its relation with other nations or peoples. Whitaker 
confronts the concept via an historic approach, consulting mainly other historians. Whitaker 
cites Hans Kohn, a famous American philosopher and historian: ‘nationalism is “first and 
foremost a state of mind, an act of consciousness” – specifically, “the individual’s 
identification of himself with the ‘we-group’ to which he gives supreme loyalty”…Yet while 
“Nationalism as a group-consciousness is a psychological or sociological fact” it cannot be 
explained in psychological or sociological terms alone, for nationality is a historical and 
political concept’ (Whitaker, 1962, p. 4). 
 
Whitaker also cites Carlton Hayes, another authority on the studies of nationalism, who 
defined nationalism as “as fusion of patriotism with a consciousness of nationality” and 
nationality as a product of cultural and historical forces – specifically, a product combining “a 
common language (or closely related dialects) and… a community of historical traditions.” 
Hayes, too, stresses “the fluidity of nationalities in the long run of history.” 
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He differentiates sharply between cultural nationalism and political nationalism, holding that 
when the cultural bases of nationality become ‘by some process of education…the object of 
popular emotional patriotism, the result is nationalism’ (Whitaker, 1962, p. 4). 
 
Interesting about the book of Whitaker is that he uses Argentina as a case study of the 
history of nationalism in Latin America. In the first chapter, he already stated that 
nationalism came via the European Enlightenment and via the United States before reaching 
the newly independent countries on the continent of Latin America in the 19th century. 
Then, in the second chapter he discusses the case of Argentina. ‘Argentina is representative 
of Latin America at large in the sense that it is already well advanced in stages of economic, 
social, cultural and political development which most of the other Latin American countries 
are still striving to reach’ (Whitaker, 1962, p. 25). 
 
Whitaker roughly divides Argentine nationalism in three phases: In the first phase, which 
extended from the beginning of independence about 1810 to the turn of the century, 
Argentine nationalism was essentially introspective, liberal, and benevolent safe during the 
interlude of the Rosas tyranny in the 1830’s and ‘40’s; and at all times its chief function was 
to combat particularism and promote union. The second phase, from the 1890’s to the 
1940’s was marked increasingly by cultural and economic nationalism and xenophobia, 
combined with a growing concern for Argentina’s international role and, towards the close, 
an expansionist, aggressive spirit. For Whitaker, the third phase is harder to characterize 
because for him it was still recent, but also because he observes a fragmentation of the 
Argentine society since the 1940’s until his days in 1962. ‘But the most distinctive trait of the 
period seems to be the trend towards harnessing nationalism to a social revolution in the 
interest of the masses – those called descamisados under the Perón regime’ (Whitaker, 
1962, p. 26). 
 
For this thesis, it is interesting to mention what Whitaker writes about the beginning of 
nationalism in Argentina. He states that nationalism in Argentina started thanks to Great 
Britain and began to take shape even before the struggle of independence from Spain. He 
refers to the British attempts to seize Buenos Aires in 1806-1807. During the siege, the locals 
were left on their own by the Spanish crown.  
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The citizens of Buenos Aires successfully defended their territory, which gave a mayor boost 
to the Argentininian pride. It was celebrated as El triunfo argentino, which was also the title 
of a poem written by a well-known bard of the time, Vicente López y Planes. ‘It also helped 
to bring about, years later, the adoption of “Argentina” as the name of the new nation state’ 
(Whitaker, 1962, p. 27). It was basically this triumph over the British that gave the 
Argentinians their independence and national pride. Bearing this in mind, a struggle against 
the British presence on a group of islands relatively close to the Argentinian coast, is perhaps 
easier to understand.  
 
Going back to more modern stages of nationalism in Latin America, Eric Hobsbawm 
mentions in his article ‘Nacionalismo y nacionalidad en América Latina’ (2010) that in Latin 
America the identification with a nation-state through the admiration of a person who 
supersedes the nation-state is more important than other forms of political identification 
Hobsbawm links the old tradition of the caudillismo to the modern concept of nationalism, 
seeing some classical caudillos transforming into revolutionary or populist leaders. 
 
How does Hobsbawm see the current and the future state of nationalism in Latin America? 
He mentions three characteristics of the current state of nationalism in other parts of the 
world to illustrate the anomaly of Latin America. The first characteristic he mentions is that 
nationalism is justified along etno-linguistic/religious lines. Secondly, nationalism often 
comes with ideas of separatism. Thirdly, nationalists are focused on a clear religious, political 
or a cultural past and heritage. In some more extreme cases this includes a longing for 
territorial expansion. Finally, nationalists often find internal enemies, like the sitting 
government or immigrants, more than that they are directed outwards against other states.  
 
Latin America differs from these global characteristics of nationalism. This is what 
Hobsbawm calls the anomaly of Latin America. When it comes to the first characteristic of 
ethnic-linguistic justification, the common tongue in Latin America is Castilian or Portuguese, 
although some use minorities have an indigenous language as their mother tongue but these 
are not in any way a possible replacement for the European languages. 
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Also, the historical-religious aspect of nationalism in other parts of the world, does not add 
up for Latin America. ‘The religious history of all continental states is Catholic, and although 
there are both nativist and syncretic cults, no country, with the probable exception of Haïti, 
sees these cults as essential for their identity’ (Hobsbawm, 2010, p. 323). Furthermore, the 
vast amounts of immigrants from the other side of the ocean have successfully integrated in 
the most significant countries, such as Uruguay, Argentina and the south of Brazil, with the 
possible exception of the big Jewish community in Argentina who were (auto)excluded for 
one or two generations. Surprisingly, even the Arab immigrants were accepted in the Latin 
American societies and they succeeded in obtaining high-ranked positions in several of the 
Republics, e.g. the former Argentinian president Carlos Menem, who was a child of Syrian 
immigrants. 
 
Finally, Hobsbawm does not predict many future conflicts internally or externally arising 
from nationalistic sentiments within the region: ‘Undoubtedly, the so-called nationals serve 
within the countries to reinforce domestic demagogues and populist leaders, but given the 
low profile of labor migration in this area, the ever-present and popular xenophobia typical 
of Western Europe and North America does not seem to exist’ (Hobsbawm, 2010, pp. 324-
325). 
  
Another important element in Latin American nationalism in general, but also in the 
nationalistic ideas of the Kirchner presidents, is the collective belonging expressed through 
the idiom of natural resources. Both Néstor Kirchner as well as Cristina Fernández have 
stated that by controlling the Malvinas, the British are able to steal natural resources from 
Argentina. The Kelpers, as the citizens of the Malvinas are called, are among the richest 
populations in the world. They profit from the presence of natural resources such as fish, 
petroleum and minerals. Resources that belong to Argentina, as the Kirchnerists say.  
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A main argument of resource nationalism is that people of a given country, rather than 
private corporations or foreign entities, should benefit from the resources of a territorially-
defined state. ‘Resource nationalism is a geopolitical discourse about sovereignty, the state, 
and territory, as well as the rights and privileges of citizenship, national identity, and the 
values a group assigns to resources like oil, gas and minerals’ (Koch & Perreault, 2018, p. 
612). Resource nationalism often appears in the form of political speeches or through the 
nationalization of resource industries, but it can also appear in the form of graffiti, statues or 
popular mobilizations. Like that, resource nationalism has political economic and cultural 
symbolic forms, both of which are intertwined and mutually reinforcing. Ordinary citizens or 
groups of activists can use the language of resource nationalism to combat foreign influence 
in their countries resource industries, contesting how benefits and harms are divided (Koch 
& Perreault, 2018, p. 612).   
 
Between 2006 and 2014, the governments of Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Argentina have 
started to nationalize their oil and gas industries for over several billion dollars in assets. This 
can be seen as a counter-reaction to the years of laissez-faire policies of neoliberalism that 
used to dominate Latin American politics after the 1990s. The term that is used to capture 
these policies is resource nationalism. ‘It is a return to the failed import-substitution policies 
of the past.’ (Haslam & Heidrich, 2016, p. 2) Haslam and Heidrich understand resource 
nationalism as a combination of policies: increased state apportionment of profits from 
extractive industries; heightened regulation to better integrate production processes with 
national economies, and state influence in or a determination of directions of trade of natural 
resources. They state that in theory, resource nationalism could contribute to the 
development of a country, although the past has shown that this is far from certain. Among 
other factors, it depends on whether the state is capable of extracting the resources and if 
that state is able to manage the income that these resources generate. Professor Nievas, 
sociologist at the University of Buenos Aires, mentioned in an interview I held with him, that 
in case Argentina would successfully claim the Falkland Islands, it would not have the financial 
means to extract the oil that the British are currently extracting.  
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The return to resource nationalism can be attributed to a decline of neoliberalism and a 
resurge of leftist politics in Latin America. However, the fact that these leftist politicians, such 
as Néstor Kirchner or Lula da Silva in Brazil, have laid emphasis on the national recuperation 
of resources can also be contributed to the commodity boom that started in the early 2000s. 
The demand for commodities, such as oil, minerals, gas and agricultural products, like soy 
beans, rose thanks to the emerging markets of the BRIC-countries. Prices of these 
commodities rose between 300 percent and 1000 percent which greatly benefited the terms 
of trade for Latin American countries, as commodity exporters. For Argentina, this might have 
been an extra incentive to try to claim the resources around the Malvinas.  
 
Concluding, two related concepts play a role in the politics of Néstor Kirchner and Cristina 
Fernández: nationalism and resource nationalism. Nationalism has a long history in Latin 
America. It comes often in the form of patriotism, with a strong love for the Patria and for the 
national community. Although it has always been present in Latin America, it has gone through 
several important phases. In the case of Argentina, the years of Peron introduced a new kind 
of nationalism that has influenced nationalistic politicians for years to come, including the 
Kirchnerists. Perón harnessed nationalism to achieve a social revolution in the interest of the 
masses. A nationalism that is mainly direct inwards, for domestic gain. At the start of the 
2000s, nationalism in Latin America gets a new dimension. Influenced by the commodities 
boom, the new leftist patriots implement policies that are directed to nationalizing the 
exploitation of the country’s resources. Resources that can also be found in large numbers 
around the islands in the South Atlantic.  
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Chapter 2 
From neoliberalism to state interventionism 
 
After having laid out the theoretical fundament of this thesis and after having explained the 
bigger concepts that surround it, this chapter provides a historical context and political 
context of the issue of the Malvinas in Argentina. The first paragraph tells the history of the 
rapprochement between Argentina and Great Britain during the years of Carlos Menem, a 
neoliberalist and Peronist, who in my opinion is an interesting example to contrast with the 
Kirchners because his policies regarding the issue of the Malvinas were the opposite of those 
of the Kirchners.   Then this paragraph describes the dramatic temporary end of 
neoliberalism in Argentina with the fleeing of Menem’s successor Fernando de la Rúa from 
the Casa Rosada. This is to get a better image of the anti-neoliberal circumstances under 
which Néstor Kirchner came to power. Then, the second paragraph shows the political 
context of Kirchnerism. It pictures how the Kirchners governed and how they tried to undo 
almost all of the neoliberal reforms that Menem had implemented. How Argentina went 
from a Washington Consensus ‘poster child’ towards a state-led economy.   
 
2.1 Menem’s rapprochement with Great Britain (1989-1999) 
 
The end of the war over the Malvinas in 1982 also meant the reinstatement of democracy in 
Argentina. Raul Alfonsín was the first president to be elected freely after more than 50 years 
of dictatorship. However, this did not mean direct reconciliation with Great Britain. In fact, 
the diplomatic relations between Argentina and Great Britain only hardened. This was 
partially due to the strong position of the Margaret Thatcher who made clear that there was 
no leeway for negotiation on the position of the Malvinas. Where Thatcher refused to talk 
about the formal sovereignty of the Malvinas, Alfonsín refused to renew the dialogue with 
the UK unless the subject of the Malvinas could be raised during these exchanges. Several 
meetings between both countries, organized by the Swiss Foreign Ministry, were fruitless. 
Military training sessions by the British Army in the South Atlantic led to an Argentinian 
effort to ask for support at the UN, to achieve a complete removal of the military presence 
in the region (Dodds & Manóvil, 2007, p. 110).  
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Change came with the change of power. Margaret Thatcher got replaced by the John Major 
and Alfonsín made way for Carlos Menem. Menem’s government had a more pragmatic 
stance and aimed at restoring diplomatic relations with Great Britain. This had a lot to do 
with the political ideology of Menem and his government. Seen from a neoliberal 
perspective, many of his actions with respect to foreign affairs are explainable. This is also 
recognizable in the way his government dealt with the issue of the Malvinas. Menem’s 
primary objective was to restore order and calm in the Argentinian society, which would 
eventually benefit the economy as well. He hoped to attract foreign investments to 
Argentina. For that, a good relationship with foreign powers, including Great Britain, was 
vital. When assuming office, Menem spoke in front of Congress, proclaiming that he would 
do anything in his power to recuperate the Malvinas. But he added: ‘But also in this area we 
will act realistically. We need the diplomatic channels that we use to reaffirm our rights do 
not hinder our economic relationship with Europe’ (Sánchez & Gómez, 2014, p. 117). 
 
The UK and Argentina signed two agreements in Madrid, in 1989 and 1990, in which they 
agreed upon a “sovereignty umbrella”. The umbrella was supposed to freeze the sovereignty 
dispute and to protect the legal positions of both countries in respect of the sovereignty 
dispute. Simply said, it meant that Argentina would stop it sovereignty claims of the 
Malvinas. In return, the British also allowed Argentina to trade with the European 
Community. The EC-Argentina trade had been blocked by the British since 1982. 
Furthermore, they lifted the mutual tax restrictions to improve financial and economic 
relations. Both of which were important steps for the neoliberal policies of Menem (Del 
Pezzo, 2016, p. 129). 
 
From 1990 and onwards new steps towards reconciliation between Argentina and Great 
Britain were taken. First, both countries created a system of communications, in which they 
could inform each other on the activities of the fishing fleet in the South Atlantic. Secondly, 
they gave a joint declaration in which they declared that position on the question of 
sovereignty remained unchanged. Thirdly, under the auspices of the Red Cross, Argentinian 
relatives were allowed to visit the graves of their lost family members at the Darwin 
cemetery on the Malvinas.  
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Secondly, the Argentinian Constitution of 1994 acknowledged that the Falklanders had their 
own language and cultural traditions, instead of being just an abstract geographic location. 
Fourthly, the Malvinas ought to be more actively involved in negotiations over future 
contact and relations with South America. These were important steps for the local Malvinas 
community, because now they were finally recognized as a community distinct from the 
Argentinian communities as well as that they were independent enough to negotiate on its 
own. The new Argentinian Foreign Minister, Guido Di Tella, would even phone ‘Kelpers’ 
privately to talk about the territorial dispute. Fifthly, new commissions such as the South 
Atlantic Fisheries Commission (1990) and later the South West Atlantic Hydrocarbons 
Commission (1996) organized new means to keep an open and constructive dialogue 
between the two countries. Finally, Menem’s government officially ended the state of 
hostility of Argentina with Great Britain (Dodds & Manóvil, 2007, p. 111).  
 
All of these measurements ensured a renewed regional integration of the Malvinas and a 
profound improvement of Anglo-Argentine diplomatic and economic relations. However, 
later on in his presidency, Menem started to move from the policy of desmalvinización of 
the Argentinian society towards remalvinización  This meant that his policies towards the 
Malvinas became more and more paradoxical. On the one hand, Argentina was still pursuing 
co-operative arrangements but on the other hand they started pushing their sovereignty 
claim over the Islands again. This was reflected in an annual session held in the late 1990s by 
the UN Decolonisation Committee.  The Argentinian delegation kept pushing their claim on 
the Malvinas to be respected. The UK-Falkland delegation kept repeating their right of self-
determination. The Falklanders reminded all the states present of the colonial danger of 
larger states consuming the smaller ones without regard of international law and the right of 
self-determination.  
 
In October 1998, Augusto Pinochet was detained by the British police in London. Pinochet 
was facing extradition to Spain, who asked for his arrests as a suspect of human right abuses 
in Chile between 1983 and 1989. Although Margaret Thatcher had already stepped down, 
she reminded the British people that Pinochet and Chile had helped the British during the 
Malvinas War against Argentina. 
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As a retaliation for Pinochet’s arrest, starting in March 1999 Chile detained its flight service 
between Punta Arenas and the Malvinas, which left the Islanders without flight connections 
to the mainland. Therefore they became dependent on the Royal Air Force (RAF) air link with 
the UK. After diplomatic pressure by Argentina, their MERCOSUR partners Uruguay and 
Brazil stated that they would no longer be able to host RAF emergence diversion facilities on 
their soil. This practically meant that flying to the Malvinas from the UK would be too big of 
a risk. The Falklanders saw that they were left isolated without the regional support. They 
asked the UK government to reopen negotiations with Argentina. In the past, they had relied 
mostly on Chile’s partnership in case the Argentinians turned against them (Dodds & 
Manóvil, 2007, p. 112). 
 
The MERCOSUR pressure on the Falkland community, organized by Argentina, led to a new 
Joint Statement in 1999. It consisted of six components: First of all, for the first time since 
1982, everyone with an Argentinian passport was allowed on the Malvinas, instead of just 
family members of fallen soldiers.  Second of all, both countries signed a fishery agreement, 
in which they promised to combat illegal fishing. Third, a new monument could be placed on 
the Darwin cemetery where the Argentinian soldiers were buried. Fourth, after a seven-
month break, from October 1999 flights were too be resumed between Punta Arenas and 
the Malvinas, with a regular lay-over at the Argentinian town of Rio Gallegos. Finally, the 
Argentinian government promised to review the names that were given by the military junta 
in the early 1980 to certain places on the Islands, such as Puerto Argentino (Stanley). All of 
these new actions happened under the earlier-mentioned “sovereignty umbrella” which 
stated ‘that none of the above will prejudice either side’s claim to sovereignty (Dodds & 
Manóvil, 2007, pp. 113-114).   
 
Going back to the figure of Carlos Menem, it is important to realize that Menem was elected 
without the strong support of an existent political, economic, military or labour structure. He 
got chosen as a ‘outsider’, even though he was the nominee of the Peronist party, like the 
Kirchners were also nominees of that party. Knowing that, it is even more surprising that 
Menem got elected while pursuing neoliberal market reforms, which contrasted sharply with 
the interventionist, isolationist and anti-imperialist character of Peronism that use the be 
the ruling economic philosophy in Argentina.   
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Menem’s critics, within and outside of his party, believed that he drastically changed 
Argentina’s economy because he wanted to please the United States. This assumption is too 
short-sighted. Domingo Cavallo (2017), who was first Menem’s Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and later President of the Central Bank, wrote that Menem had observed the changing world 
order. He had anticipated on the end of the Cold War and he predicted that globalization 
would provide opportunities for Argentina. It might be difficult to prove that Menem was a 
visionary, but it is clear that he was far more outward looking than most of his predecessors 
had been since the 1930s. His charisma, simplicity and common sense convinced the 
Argentinian voters that he was would be a trust-worthy president (Cavallo & Cavallo, 2017, 
p. 189). 
 
To say that Menem changed his policies just to please the United States is short-sighted, but 
during his presidency he did show a special interest in maintaining a good relationship with 
the US government. The Cold War was over, the United States had secured their global 
ideological hegemony. American-led globalisation was unavoidable and only an open 
alignment with the US would put Argentina in a more advantageous position. Foreign 
Minister Guido Di Tella said that Argentina was willing to have ‘carnal and abject relations 
with the United States’ (Aguiló, 2018, p. 25). 
 
Externally Argentina took on a very active role. Some of its foreign policies became source of 
controversy: For instance, Argentina’s military participation in the Gulf War, the open 
support of US suggestions for high-ranked positions of international organizations, the active 
support of a US campaign for the defence of human rights on Cuba, the backing of the 
restauration of the democratically-elected government on Haitï or the participation in all 
kinds of peacekeeping missions (Diamint, 2002, p. 16). Many of these examples were 
initiatives taken by the United States, that suddenly could count on Argentinian support. 
Another case that led to controversy domestically, was Argentina’s nomination by Bill 
Clinton in 1997 as part of the group of the so-called Major Non-NATO Allies of the United 
States. These countries are not official members of NATO, but do have a strategic working 
relationship with the US Armed Forces.  
 
 26 
It confers a variety of military and financial advantages that would otherwise not be 
available. Other countries on that list are: South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Israel 
among others. Argentina was the first Latin American country to be accepted as a Non-NATO 
Ally. Domestically, Menem’s government tried to keep a much lower profile. They presented 
the drastic market reforms as inevitable, after the last few crisis years under the presidency 
of Alfonsín. In an address to Congress in 1989 Menem stated: ‘We are going to privatize as 
much as necessary, it is not a question of dogma but of necessity…As I pointed out many 
times, I don’t believe in privatism or statism. I believe in ‘Argentinism’ with capital letters. 
Privatising public companies is an instrument to fulfil our true aims of justice, independence 
and sovereignty..I understand that we are at a crossroads that is cultural and goes beyond 
economic and political issues’ (Aguiló, 2018, p. 29). With Argentinism he tried to introduce a 
new political ideology in an attempt to depoliticize discourse and policies. By converting the 
economic and the political field into a cultural issue, he presented neoliberalism as a part of 
common sense.  
 
At first the neoliberalist policies worked out quite well in economic terms. Foreign 
investments flowed in, consumerism boomed, the infrastructure was Americanized, with 
large shopping malls and luxury hotels as a result. Also, in 1991, Domingo Cavallo, the 
before-mentioned Minister of Finance, came with the Convertibility Plan. A plan that was 
organized around fiscal tightening, connecting the peso to the dollar combined with the 
unrestricted opening of the economy. The Convertibility Plan was successful in tackling the 
hyperinflation that was developed under the Alfonsín-regime. On top of that, labour markets 
were deregulated, state enterprises were privatized and many public utility services were 
privatized, such as the national airline, the operations of the railways, waterways, airports 
and the national post service among others. Economists praised Menem’s policies as an 
economic miracle. There was optimism that Argentina finally had embraced the road of 
development. Neoliberalism was provided with the social validation it had lacked in the past. 
The early 1990s in Argentina, the fiesta menemista as they came to call it, were 
characterized by consumism, optimism, frivolity and opulence (Aguiló, 2018, p. 30). 
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After Menem’s re-election by a large margin in 1995, the downsides of the unrestricted 
neoliberal policies started to become more and more apparent. The economic growth did 
not translate in the decline of unemployment, rather on the contrary: joblessness grew 
because of the loss of jobs at state-run companies by 70 percent. The influx of cheap import 
products made local industries otiose. Furthermore, the inequality grew out of hand: the 
Gini-coefficient was 0.36 in 1974 but by 2001 it stood at 0.51 with a ratio of 58.4 
respectively. In 1998, the Argentinian economy came in a recession, partially due to financial 
crises in Russia and Asia. Now that the country came in a crisis at the end of the 1990s, 
people started to blame the widespread and continuing corruption by Menem’s officials as a 
major contributor to the country’s problems. That is also how Menem’s successor framed it.  
  
Fernando de la Rúa (1999-2001) did not blame neoliberalism for the existent crisis, but much 
more he wanted to eradicate the corruption that had been running Argentina’s politics for 
years under Menem’s supervision. By promising that he would not alter the Convertibility 
Plan, de la Rúa gained a lot of support amongst those that were afraid to go back to the 
times of hyperinflation. Ending the Plan would also mean an end to the First World 
aspirations. De la Rúa failed on both fronts: he failed to counter the economic decline as well 
as he failed to combat corruption. The economic crisis continued because he did not change 
the economic model of Menem, he even re-appointed Domingo Cavallo as Minister of 
Finance. Also, a scandal in 2000 of members of parliament taking bribes to pass a Labour 
reform bill, showed that corruption had not been tackled (Aguiló, 2018, p. 33). 
 
That is how Argentina went from a Washington Consensus ‘poster child’ to another deep 
economic crisis in 2001. The Argentinians had enough of the deep recession and of its 
government. At the end of the year, protesters took the streets chanting ‘Que se vayan 
todos’ to express their discontent with the ruling political class. Social movements called for 
protection against market expansion. During riots in cities like Rosario, Mendoza, Buenos 
Aires, shops were looted and the police reacted with force (Undurraga, 2015, p. 24). De la 
Rúa had to escape with a helicopter from the Casa Rosada and was forced to resign. Cavallo 
(2017) calls it an institutional coup that paved the way for an institutional rupture that was 
unprecedented in Argentinian history.  
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First, Adolfo Rodriguez Saá took over the presidency, but he stated that he wanted to hold 
on to the Convertibility Plan, which led to new upheavals by the protestors after which Saá 
had to resign 11 days after he was assigned. Peronist Eduardo Duhalde succeeded him 
(Cavallo, 2017, p. 222). The ‘Coup’ in 2001 meant the end of the neoliberalist project that 
had started under Carlos Menem in 1989 (Cavallo & Cavallo, 2017, p. 222). 
 
The expectations for Duhalde’s presidency (2002-2003) were not all too high. The main issue 
for this government was the economic crisis and trying to bring down the foreign debts. 
Reopening discussions on the Malvinas issue was not a top priority at that time. Most 
countries were not interested in strengthening its diplomatic and economic ties with 
Argentina, due to the social upheavals and political instability. The economic paralysation 
also led to a diplomatic paralysation. This happened also because the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Carlos Ruckauf, failed to see the opportunities that international cooperation could 
bring about (Rut, 2003, p. 20).  Duhalde did manage to restore political power and order.  
 
Duhalde resigned in 2003 to make way for the governor of the province of Santa Cruz, 
Néstor Kirchner, to become the new president.  Kirchner won because Carlos Menem 
withdrew from the second-round run-off against Kirchner. Kirchner became president with 
only 22 percent of the votes which he had received thanks to the public support of Duhalde. 
 
2.2 New kind of Peronism under the Kirchner administrations 
 
When Kirchner took on the mandate, he was considered a ‘weak’ president, because he did 
not win the elections through a majority vote. To show that he was able to lead, he 
immediately reached out to social movements like the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, to the 
unions and to leftist academics. He tried to gather support for his mandate beyond party 
lines, what he called transversalismo. He called upon everyone, not matter what party they 
were from, who had a nationalist and Peronist consciousness, to support him. He found 
support among dissident radicals, communists, socialists or from young militants among 
others. For example, his vicepresident, Daniel Scioli, was originally a businessman (Galasso, 
2016, p. 66) 
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Kirchner needed support for his counter-reforms, that were supposed to undo the neoliberal 
free market reforms that had dominated Argentina and Latin America as a whole. The 
commodity boom stimulated Argentina to start a period of economic recovery and debt 
renegotiation (Levy, 2017, p. 25). The dollar weakened, the peso strengthened and inflation 
started to decline (Cavallo & Cavallo, 2017, p. 240). Wages rose gradually and after 2005 
more rapidly, the public expenditure grew significantly and unemployment dropped (Wylde, 
2017, p. 1121). The post-neoliberal government wanted to combat social inequality through 
a strong state intervention in the economy and society and through redistributive policies. 
They empowered state institutions and collective organisations, such as workers’ unions and 
human rights associations (Undurraga, 2015, p. 26).  
 
Where Menem had focussed on international cooperation, on strong ties with the United 
States and on inviting foreign investment, Kirchner did the opposite. He positioned himself 
as an anti-imperialist. His interest lied within being self-sufficient, putting heavy taxes on 
foreign products to stimulate local industries and on being less dependent on the support of 
the U.S. Kirchner wanted to strengthen regional cooperation, via the MERCOSUR, the trade 
union of the southern countries. He was also active in the creation of UNASUR, which was a 
union of South American countries to act as a counterbalance to a trade agreement 
proposed by the U.S. Kirchner’s boldest move however, was that he said ‘no’ to the IMF 
when they asked for austerity programmes. He believed that the IMF had been the cause of 
the economic crisis. He also saw the IMF as a form a Northern American imperialism 
(Galasso, 2016, 67). In 2005, after increasingly hostile relations between the IMF and the 
Argentine government, Kirchner decided to pay off the debt in total, to get rid of the IMF’s 
supervision. He paid the debt by increasing the national debt in pesos. 
 
Another sharp contrast with Menem’s government was Kirchner’s emphasis on human 
rights. One of Néstor’s first actions in government was that he asked Congress to cancel the 
amnesty laws, called Punto Final and Obediencia Debida, that president Alfonsín had 
adopted in 1986-1987, thereby stopping the trials against those who were accused with 
crimes against humanity (Levy, 2017, p. 28). In 1985 started the ‘Trials of the Junta’, that 
were unique because they never before had a country put on trial those who were politically 
responsible for mass violations of human rights.  
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Later in 1989, Menem gradually pardoned those who got convicted. Kirchner established a 
warm band with the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, the mothers and grandmothers of children 
of the disappeared, were the first organized group to protest against the military 
dictatorship. Up to now, they have been calling for justice every Thursday since 1973. 
Kirchner was the first president that openly supported the Madres. Also, Kirchner created an 
Espacio de Memoria y Derechos Humanos in Buenos Aires to strengthen the human rights 
movement in Argentina (Levy, 2017, p. 31). 
 
Néstor Kirchner was a new kind of Peronist. From the 1940s and onwards Peronism had 
always relied on the power of workers and unions, but also it had been a conservative 
movement that ruled with a powerful elite, that included the union leadership. Carlos 
Menem was also a Peronist, who had abandoned the working class by privatizing state 
companies and pensions. Kirchner, a left-wing Peronist, was a political activist, an unknown 
‘outsider’, who advocated for social justice, and who was against military dictatorship. When 
he was studying Law at the La Plata University, he saw many of his fellow students disappear 
or killed by security forces. That is what explains his strong support for human rights 
organizations. Also, social organizations became involved in the policy-making and in the 
implementation of new government programmes, particularly those concerned with social 
protection and human rights (Levy, 2017, p. 44). ‘It is a weird Peronism, a Peronism after 
Peronism’ (Galasso, 2016, p. 79). 
 
In 2007, Néstor Kirchner decided not to go for a second term in office. He wanted to make 
way for his wife and senator Cristina Fernández to run for the presidency. The idea was that 
by switching from one to another they could avoid the constitutional restriction of doing 
only two successive terms. That is how they would create a Kirchner dynasty (Cavallo & 
Cavallo, 2017, p. 241). Cristina’s election was hard-fought, winning with 45 percent of the 
votes against her direct opponents, Elisa Carrió and Roberto Lavagna (both independent 
candidates) who respectively got 23 percent and 17 percent of the votes.  
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The plan was to continue most of the policies that Néstor Kirchner had already set in motion. 
Cristina Fernández re-appointed most of the cabinet members that had already served in 
Néstor government. Although Néstor remained involved in a lot of the decision-making, 
Cristina showed a different style of leadership. She became known for her boldness and 
explicitness about her opinions. She was able to give seemingly endless improvised 
speeches, which she made to the state-controlled media, where she made her policies 
known. International media often talked about Néstor’s wife when they referred to Cristina. 
They overlooked the fact that she already had quite a lengthy career in politics. She had 
been involved in politics since her student life, when she also met Néstor. In the 1990s, she 
had been elected in both Houses of Congress (Levy, 2017, p. 51). 
 
Cristina Fernández had a strong power base to build on. Partially that was thanks to the 
economic growth, a reduction in debts for the first time in decades and a widespread feeling 
of progress and optimism that was created during the presidency of Néstor. Politically, 
Néstor and Cristina had worked hard to find support. Néstor had become the leader of the 
Partido Justicialista, the Peronist party. They had worked on aligning local governors and 
local governments to their leadership. Furthermore, they gained a lot of support from 
human rights organizations, union confederations and social organizations.  
 
Cristina wanted to continue ‘The Model’, as Néstor Kirchner had called his economic 
policies. This model was based on the idea of a developmental state, in which the 
government oversees the economic activity for the benefit of the society. In this ‘Model’, 
capitalism is accepted as the running system and they accepted that the market has its own 
domain, but the ‘free market’ is rejected. The market is part of society and both have 
reciprocal responsibilities. The idea is that the state provides the necessary infrastructure 
and will guarantee the rule of law and the market will ultimately pay back the debt by paying 
taxes and providing social security (Levy, 2017, p. 65).  
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The Kirchners created a new social contract. First, they widely expanded social welfare to 
the poor and working classes. In addition, they increased the minimum wage. Secondly, the 
middle-class was attracted to the new regime, thanks to macroeconomic developments and 
a favourable exchange rate policy from which the middle-class profited. Finally, stimulation 
of export favoured the agro-industrialist. A agro-industry that was dominated by 
transnational corporations (TNC’s). That is how this government ensured that welfare was 
spread among multiple classes (Wylde, 2018, p. 334). 
 
However, during Cristina’s rule, tensions between social groups started to rise. She created a 
political atmosphere of ‘be with us or be against us’, which obviously led to polarization. In 
2008, there was widespread social unrest causes by farmers when Cristina’s government 
announced an extension of the retenciones (export taxes) on soybean products from 35 
percent to 40 percent, which greatly affected producers of soybeans (a prime export product 
of Argentina), but also producers of maize, wheat and sunflower seeds. Farmers around the 
country blocked major roads to ports and cities, preventing the passing of trucks carrying 
agricultural products (Wylde, 2018, p. 334). From 2008 and onwards, opposition against 
Cristina’s government started to grow, criticizing the economic policies and accusing the 
government for being authoritarian and corrupt. Also, the global economic recession hit 
Argentina’s export revenues hard.  
 
Polarization grew significantly during Cristina’s presidency. This was very clearly reflected in 
the media, where moderate debates and nuanced opinions lost ground. Cristina’s supporters 
and Cristina herself often used the classical media to convey their message, where the 
opposition often made use of social media or published books. There was loud criticism on 
social media on the way how the government used public revenues to pay for 
advertisements that were meant to promote a certain publication that looked favourably 
upon the government’s policies (Levy, 2017, p. 75).  
 
In 2009, Cristina’s government launched Fútbol para Todos, a state television programme 
that had bought all the rights to broadcast the Argentinian league matches as well as the 
international games of the national team. 
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The broadcasting rights that previously had been in the hands of Clarín, a private media-
agglomerate that was often critical of Cristina and her policies. When Fútbol para Todos 
ended in 2017, it had cost the Argentinian state, in eight years’ time, more than a hundred 
million euros. This led to criticism about the way the government spend public revenue for 
populist purposes. On top of that, opponents were critical about the way Cristina made 
extensive use of television and radio broadcasting for political purposes.  
 
On the 27th of October 2010, the surprising news came that Néstor Kirchner had died as a 
result of a heart attack. He was then 60 years old. His funeral at the Casa Rosada attracted 
large masses, who were chanting “Fuerza Cristina” to show their support. This chant became 
one of her campaign slogans, during the electoral campaign one year later in 2011. A few 
days after Néstor’s funeral, Cristina broadcasted a five-minute-long message on the state 
television where she reinvigorated the figure of the former president and where she 
thanked the people for their widespread signs of support. She was especially thankful for the 
presence of large amounts of young people among the crowd during Nestor’s funeral.1 
(Pucciarelli & Castellani, 2017, p. 399). 
 
You could say that after Néstor Kirchner’s dead, Kirchnerism changed into what you could 
call ‘Cristinism’. Cristina became more outspoken, more militant and her policies more 
profound. Her support grew stronger after Néstor’s dead, especially among the middle-class 
and young Argentinians. She reached the height of her popularity in October 2011, when 
several opinions polls showed a 63 percent approval rate against a 16 percent disapproval 
rate (Pucciarelli & Castellani, 2017, p. 399). The high popularity rate was translated into a re-
election in that same year. Almost exactly a year after Néstor passed away, in the 
presidential elections of October 2011, Cristina Fernández was re-elected president by an 
unprecedented margin of 54 percent of the votes to 16 percent for the second-placed 
candidate Hermes Binner of the Socialist Party (Galasso, 2016, p. 257).  
 
 
 
1 The national broadcast of the 1st of November: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s5WHx8WJqMI 
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Economically Argentina was overcoming the international crisis that started in 2007. 
Cristina’s new government could lean on economic numbers that showed a growing 
economy, record-high levels of consume, goods and services, public revenue and industrial 
capacity. During the year 2011, poverty rates became historically low, as well as 
unemployment. Furthermore, the income of workers grew with 370 percent for both the 
formal and informal sector (Pucciarelli & Castellani, 2017, p. 399). Cristina’s policies were 
meant to deepen ‘the Model’. This came in the form of welfare extension. Besides extending 
minimum wages and raising wages for the workers, she also maintained or even raised 
generous state subsidies in a number of areas, but especially in transport, energy and fuel. 
Obviously, these redistributive measures came at a cost: inflation. Also, Cristina abandoned 
fiscal and current surpluses, she used export restrictions to limit the amount of foreign 
exchange in the domestic economy and she issued high import taxes on foreign products to 
back the domestic industry, which created advantages for a part of the society, but certainly    
not for all (Wylde, 2018, p. 337). 
 
Economic inclusion of the workers was one of the main pillars, but Cristina’s government 
became also known for its struggle for social inclusion. An important part of that fight was 
Cristina’s strong advocacy for women’s rights. Although women’s rights were already clearly 
incorporated in the Argentinian Constitution, in practice these rights were all too often being 
violated. Partially that was because of the strong influence of the Catholic church, that was 
at odds with most of the efforts for social inclusion. In terms of reproductive rights, the 
Kirchner governments advanced in small steps. They eventually made contraceptives freely 
available and they expanded sex education. The Catholic Church remained powerful and 
often intervened behind the scenes, which meant that contraceptives were not distributed 
and that doctors were pressured to treat women who are entitled by law to have an 
abortion, such as victims of rape. Another major challenge for women in Argentina is male 
violence, present at all levels of society, which leads to many, mostly undocumented cases 
of injury or even death. In 2015, as a result of large protests under the slogan #NiUnaMenos, 
the Supreme Court and the government agreed to set up a registry of femicides and to 
create better records to support women suffering violence (Levy, 2017, p. 71). 
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During Cristina’s time in power there was a broad legal recognition of the rights to gender 
and sexual identity. She tried to make an end to the society where the Catholic Church 
delivered and had guided social and sexual education. This meant that Cristina’s government 
gave new legal rights to the gay community. In 2010, a law was passed through Congress 
that introduced same-sex marriages, which in many ways was an advance of the society’s 
acceptance of gay relationships. This new law led to a more widely spread tolerance in 
Argentina towards homosexuality (Levy, 2017, p. 72). 
 
Cristina Fernández’ battle for more social inclusivity made her very popular among young 
Argentinians. This was quite unique in the modern political world where politicians struggle 
to engage voters in general and young people in particular. During the Kirchner’ 
presidencies, young people become politically organized and were given an influential 
platform by Cristina, that was named Cámpora, which was also the name of the president 
that organized the return of Perón to Argentina in 1973. The organization, with the original 
motto of ‘our country is the other’, referring to the importance of social inclusivity, is led by 
Maximo Kirchner, Cristina’s and Néstor’s son. In the 2015 elections, the Cámpora managed 
to get 24 deputies and three senators in Congress. All of them were loyal to Kirchnerism. On 
Cristina’s last day in office, in December 2015, something unique happened: supporters 
turned up on the Plaza de Mayo, spontaneously and not organized by activists, to thank her 
and to wish her all the best (Levy, 2017, p. 73). 
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Chapter 3 
Reinvigoration of the Argentinian claim to the Malvinas 
 
In the previous two chapters, I have laid out the theoretical framework of this thesis and I 
have sketched a political and historical background of the last two decades in Argentina in 
which it underwent major changes. In this chapter, I shall apply both the theoretical insights 
and the scene-setting context to my analysis of the Malvinas issue in Argentina from 2003 
until 2015 when successively Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández held the presidential 
mandate. The first paragraph positions Kirchnerism within the issue of the Malvinas, 
addressing the motivation for Néstor Kirchner to reinvigorate the claim of the Malvinas, 
after which the second paragraph focusses on the efforts made by Cristina Fernández, which 
proved to be more radical. For this analysis, I will use the information that I have gathered 
during the interviews with experts in this field.  
 
1.1 Kirchnerism and the issue of the Malvinas 
 
In this paragraph, I will explain why Néstor Kirchner halted a long period of appeasement 
policies that started after the war in 1982 in which successive governments had sought to 
restore bilateral ties with the United Kingdom. Instead, Néstor Kirchner and later Cristina 
Fernández, reinvigorated the claim on the islands in the South Atlantic. What motivated 
them and how does this fit into the ideology of Kirchnerism? 
 
During the interviews I conducted in Argentina, most of the experts often mentioned the 
descendance of the Kirchners as an obvious explanation for their preoccupation with the 
Malvinas issue. Both Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández have their roots in the 
Patagonian province of Santa Cruz.  Their hometown is Río Gallegos, which is also the city 
where the ships and airplanes departed in 1982 to go the Malvinas. It is the place where the 
local population waved the soldiers goodbye, some of which never returned. Río Gallegos is 
the place where the war was experienced most vividly and most gruesome. Buenos Aires lies 
2500 kilometers further north which is why a lot of Argentinians lived through the war in a 
different way.  
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It is likely that the first-hand experience of the Malvinas War in Río Gallegos might have 
motivated the Kirchners to newly put emphasis on the Argentinian claim of the Malvinas. Up 
to today, Río Gallegos is still the only city in Argentina with a flight connection to the 
Malvinas.  
 
Besides of personal motivation, there are also several ideological reasons for which the 
reinvigoration of the claim of the Malvinas became a top priority within Kirchnerism. First of 
all, the notion of national sovereignty, on several different levels such as economic 
sovereignty, sovereignty of debts and territorial sovereignty, plays an important role within 
Kirchnerism. Furthermore, the defense of national sovereignty coincides with the anti-
imperialist character of the Kirchnerist governments. They wanted to end the omnipresence 
of foreign influence in Argentina, that had mainly spread during the neoliberal governments 
of Carlos Menem. As mentioned before, the Kirchners wanted to ‘take back control’ with a 
strong state interference in many different parts of society. This also meant the rejection of 
the territorial presence of a foreign power relatively close to the Argentinian coastline.  
 
The emphasis on national sovereignty is not unique in Latin American politics. However, as 
described in the previous chapter, when Néstor Kirchner got elected in 2003, Argentina just 
experienced one of the worst economic and institutional crises in its history. Kirchner had to 
rebuild the country without a strong popular mandate (Montero & Vincent, 2013, p. 123). A 
full restructuring of the political regime was necessary to regain the lost trust of the 
Argentinian people in their politicians. Kirchner sought to create his own new model. A 
model that found its basis in developmentalism. He wanted to distance himself from 
previous governments, demonize the past and turn the page of history through social and 
cultural change. The objective was to reconciliate society with politics by creating a common 
national project (Montero & Vincent, p. 126), of which the reinvigoration of the Malvinas 
issue became part.  
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On the first day of his presidency, the 25th of May 2003, Néstor Kirchner immediately 
declared that he would use the opportunities of bilateral engagements as well as 
international fora, such as the Decolonization Committee of the United Nations, the OAS or 
the MERCOSUR, to reclaim the sovereignty of the Islands of the South Atlantic, which 
included Malvinas, Sandwich del Sur and Georgias del Sur (Sanchez & Gomez, 2014, p. 50). 
It became his mission to find a multilateral cooperation to back the sovereignty claim against 
the United Kingdom. He wanted to make the issue of the Malvinas a Latin American wide 
struggle for sovereignty over the former colonial powers.  
 
During the first two years of Néstor Kirchner’s government, the Anglo-Argentine diplomatic 
relationship faced challenges, arising from the Malvinas issue. Besides from the struggle over 
fishing licenses, the Kelpers were also much more reluctant in allowing flights coming from 
Argentina. In 2007, triggered by the reduction of (charter)flights to the Islands, the 
Argentinian government made its intentions known, that they only wanted to allow weekly 
flights, under Argentinian flag. The Kelper committee resisted, which ultimately led to the 
total suspension of direct flight connections coming from the Argentinian mainland to the 
airport of Port Stanley (Del Pezzo, 2016, p. 129). 
 
At the United Nations Headquarters in New York, Kirchner and his Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Rafael Bielsa, continuously made the Argentinian claim known. They used the occasions at 
the General Assembly as well as the Decolonization Committee to find multilateral 
assistance for the bilateral dispute. However, according to the Argentinian representatives, 
the British were only acting unilaterally, which was in violation of the UN resolution 31/49, 
which ‘calls upon the two parties to refrain from taking decisions that would imply 
introducing unilateral modifications in the situation while the islands are going through the 
process recommended in the above-mentioned resolutions (UN RES/31/49). Among the 
British unilateral actions that the Argentinians complained about were the selling of fishing 
licenses in the disputed areas, the actions of the fishing police in the South Atlantic, the 
British announcements of increasing military presence in the area as well as the presence of 
a military base that had a capacity that by far exceeded the regular size of a military base on 
the islands (Gómez, 2006, p. 6).  
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During my field research in Argentina I spoke with Mario Volpe, a Malvinas War veteran, a 
self-proclaimed Kirchnerist, vice-director of the Malvinas institute CECIM La Plata and the 
former vice-director of the Malvinas Museum. The museum was brought to life at the end of 
Cristina’s second-term in office, on the 10th of June 2014.  What is interesting about this 
museum is that it presents itself as space to think about Argentina as an ‘Atlantic’ country, 
‘to imagine our relationship with the sea.’2 But more in particular, the museum invites 
visitors to learn about the geography of the Islands, the flora and fauna, broadly the 
political-historical context of the South Atlantic region and it vividly lets the visitor relive 
different socio-historic experiences of the War. For instance, the second floor hosts the 
‘Malvinas Experience’ which shows the ties between the Islands and the continent. It talks 
about the years during Spanish colonial rule, the years of British ‘occupation’, the 
‘milestones’ of the War and the current diplomatic ‘fight’.  
 
The over-arching mission of the museum is thus to give Argentinians a maritime scope. This 
is exactly what Néstor Kirchner had in mind. When asked about Kirchner’s motivations for 
reinvigorating the claim on the Malvinas, Mario Volpe told me that Kirchner based his 
motivation on the Peronist concept of a maritime Argentina. For many years, Argentina’s 
focus was continental, solely directed ‘inwards’, on agriculture and exploiting the riches of 
the land. Argentinians saw the sea as a place for tourists. Perón already had the idea of 
redirecting Argentina’s attention to the Atlantic. Néstor Kirchner reinvigorated that idea, 
part of which was reclaiming sovereignty over the Islands in the South Atlantic.  
 
Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández had several economic and strategic reasons for 
which they made the claim on the Malvinas a top priority of their policy-making. First of all, 
they pictured an image in which the British are stealing the riches of the sea close to the 
Argentinian coast. The waters surrounding the islands in the South Atlantic are full of natural 
resources, such as fish, petroleum, minerals, among others. In that sense, the sovereignty 
claim is not just focused on the Islands itself, but also on the maritime sovereignty that 
comes with it.  
 
 
2 https://museomalvinas.cultura.gob.ar/ 
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These resources have made the Kelpers a rich population, with a GDP per 
capita of 70.000 USD (2015 est.). On the Argentinian mainland, in comparison, the GDP per 
capita counts for 20.000 USD (2017 est.)3  
 
The Islands’ economy thrives on fishing and tourism. Fishery represents 34 percent of the 
total GDP counting for 108 million USD per year. A large part of that income is generated by 
the fishing of squid. In 1985 Margaret Thatcher allowed the islanders to fish in waters 
claimed by Argentina. This was a historic step for the Kelpers, who suddenly could become 
economically autonomous. In 1994 they established an Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ), 
which they called ‘Falkland Island Outer Conservation Zone’, with the space of 200 nautical 
miles around the islands. Nowadays, it is not just the local fishers who do most of the 
fisheries catching. The Malvinas government extended 25-year fishing licenses to companies 
from Taiwan, Korea, Spain and some joint ventures with Indonesia, while other countries 
have filled the southern seas with factory vessels with high seas daily catches of 50 tons. 
These vessels process and freeze catches onboard which are then transferred to other ships 
that take the cargoes to Europe. 
 
The important thing is that since these licenses are transferable. It allows whoever possess 
them (mostly local entrepreneurs) to make associations, joint ventures with any other 
outside company, to exploit the waters of the Malvinas. This means that the local resident 
who holds a license, but does not have the logistics or infrastructure, joins a foreign fishing 
company which has vessels, crews and all the staff needed for the catches and the trading. 
The fact that these fishermen are making considerable profits by exploiting waters, that 
Argentina claims to be theirs, is a thorn in the side of the Kirchners. In 2016, with Macri 
already in the Casa Rosada, an UN commission on the limits of the continental shelf, ruled 
that Argentina’s territorial waters lie at 200 to 350 miles off their coast. This also implied 
that the Malvinas and the waters surrounding it should be part of Argentinian territory.   
 
 
 
3 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print_fk.html 
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It is not just fish that the Kelpers are extracting from the waters surrounding the islands in 
the South Atlantic. In 1995, the Menem administration and the UK government signed a 
Joint Declaration in which they expressed the intention to jointly study the hydrocarbon 
potential of the disputed seas in the South West Atlantic. The British Gas Company and the 
Argentinian YPF would work together to look for petroleum and gas reserves. (Wälde & 
McHaldy, 1995, p. 301) In 2007, the Kirchner administration unilaterally withdrew from the 
agreement. In 2010, three British oil companies started drilling for hydrocarbon reservoirs 
100 miles north of the archipelago. This fueled protests among the Argentinians, including 
their government, who stated that this was a huge violation of their sovereignty. Jorge 
Taiana, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, promised that they would do ‘everything to defend 
and preserve our rights.’4 The government summoned the chargé d’affairs of the British 
Embassy and they warned Argentina-based oil companies to not intervene with the Malvinas 
oil explorations. Fabian Volonte, also a Malvinas War veteran, told the Guardian that he did 
not have faith in the threats made by his government: ‘We lost the war, now we have to 
watch the British growing rich from it and we can do nothing about it. It is just shame upon 
shame for Argentina.’5  
 
The drilling kept on going and Argentina filed a lawsuit in 2015, accusing three British and 
two US oil companies of performing illegal acts by entering Argentinian territory. Daniel 
Filmus, the Secretary for Malvinas Affairs in Cristina’s second government (2010-2015), told 
the BBC that they would use the force of the law, national and international law, to prevent 
these countries from taking the riches which belong to forty million Argentinians. Filmus: 
‘Argentina has extradition treaties around the world and we intend to use them. The area 
that is being drilled is as much ours as the center of Buenos Aires. Neither the UK nor any 
other country would allow anyone to enter their territory and take away their riches.’6 And 
as Mario Volpe told me, whoever possesses Malvinas, possesses five important elements for 
life: energy (petroleum), sweet water, proteins (fish), metals (for industry).  
 
 
4 https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/feb/07/falkland-islands-oil-britain-argentina 
5 Ibidem. 
6 https://www.bbc.com/news/business-32354222 
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Furthermore, the archipelago in the South Atlantic serves as a gateway to Antarctica. 
Argentina is one of the six states that claim sovereignty on a part of Antarctica. Argentine 
Antarctica, as they came to call it, is a triangular section of the Antarctic peninsula that lies 
between the 25 West and 74 West meridians and 60 South parallel. This area is disputed, 
because it overlaps with similar Chilean and British claims. However, all sovereignty claims 
are suspended by the Antarctic Treaty which came into force in 1961 and of which Argentina 
is a contracting party. Article IV point 2 of the Treaty states: ‘No acts or activities taking place 
while the present treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or 
denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in 
Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica shall be asserted while the present treaty is in force.’ But existing claims may 
persist. The British have based their Antarctic claim on the proximity of their territories in 
the South Atlantic. In December 2012, the UK Foreign Office announced that they would 
rename the southern part of the British Antarctic Territory into Queen Elizabeth Land. 
Cristina’s government immediately criticized the name because that area overlaps with 
Argentine Antarctica.  
 
Another thorn in the side for the Kirchner administrations and for the Argentinians in 
general is the strong military presence on the Malvinas. After the War, the UK invested 
heavily in the military defense of the Islands. In 2014, the Minister of State confirmed that 
the Malvinas were housing 1060 troops.7 The Islands are also hosting a marine base as well 
as an airbase. The Argentinians see the military presence and the large-scale training 
sessions as a provocation and as proof that the British are occupying the Islands. The British 
government has always responded that they would only deploy the minimum amount of 
military personnel that they consider necessary to protect the Islands. Cristina Fernández 
also claimed that the Malvinas serve as a NATO base. During a ceremony at the Casa Rosada 
to mark the 32 year anniversary of the Conflict, Cristina called out the British saying that the 
Islands had turned into a NATO base. ‘This is a truth they cannot hide’.8 She also claimed 
that they were testing nuclear weapons.  
 
7 https://en.mercopress.com/2014/03/08/military-personnel-in-falkland-islands-totals-
1.060-says-mod 
8 https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-26999735 
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In a response, a group of Malvinas residents posted a tweet9 with a picture of penguins, 
mocking the Argentinians that these were the nuclear missiles that they were looking for. Up 
to today, Kirchnerists are convinced that the Malvinas are hosting a NATO base. Mario Volpe 
said in the interview I conducted with him that it was ridiculous that the British needed 2000 
soldiers to protect 2000 inhabitants.  
 
3.2 Cristina Fernández’s strategies 
 
Although Néstor Kirchner was the first Argentinian president since the War to actively claim 
the Malvinas, most of the experts agree that Cristina’s attempts were much more profound. 
The interviews I have conducted and the literature I have studied mostly talk about Cristina’s  
engagement in the Malvinas issue. I decided nevertheless to include Néstor’s presidency into 
my research because his years in office marked a turning point in the Argentinian political 
discourse concerning the Malvinas issue. But it was his wife that made it one of the key 
pillars of her foreign policy. 
 
The renewed Argentinian claim of the Malvinas can be better understood when taking note 
of the broader outline of Cristina’s foreign policy. Her governments (2007-2015) aimed at 
reintegrating Argentina in to the world through: the strengthening of international law, 
respect for human rights, democratic governance, a system of balanced commerce, a better 
distribution of the benefits of globalization and a democratization of the decision-making 
within international organizations. Particular emphasis was laid on the economic and 
commercial integration into the world, and specifically the Latin American region (Bologna, 
2010, p. 244).  
 
A former official of the Secretariat for Malvinas Affairs, Sonia Winer, told me that she saw 
Cristina’s second government (2010-2015) as the most active one when it comes to 
reinvigoration of the issue of the Malvinas. Winer, who now works as a Social Sciences 
professor at the UBA, said during an interview I conducted with her that Cristina laid a strong 
emphasis on defending human rights and promoting peace in the region.  
 
9 https://twitter.com/falklands_utd/status/451720510729367552 
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She saw the British presence and the military base as a clear violation of human and 
sovereign rights as well as a threat for peace in the region.  
 
Although Cristina institutionalized the claim on the Malvinas it was already Néstor Kirchner 
who made a key decision. In the eyes of Winer, it was crucial that Kirchner decided to 
intervene in the Commission for Malvinas Veterans, that was founded in 1994 by the 
Menem administration to funnel and resolve problems that veterans face. However, back 
then, the commission was constituted of veterans that had been part of the military regime. 
When Kirchner took over, he decided to reinstall the commission with veterans who saw 
themselves as victims. Victims of torture and the humanitarian crimes committed by the 
same veterans during the war. Néstor Kirchner put these victims, so-called civilian veterans, 
in charge of the National Veterans Commission, which was seen as a powerful message. 
CECIM La Plata became the leading institute. From then on, the official memory of the War 
changed. A distinction was made between a veteran from the military and a civil veteran.  
 
There is also a ambiguity in the Kirchnerist approach of the Malvinas. If you see the veterans 
as heroes, you are reinvigorating the reason for which they went to war, but if you nominate 
them as victims you are attenuating your own arguments for wanting to reinvigorate the 
claim on the Malvinas. In a way the reinvigoration of the claim also gives new life to the 
memory of the War. Cristina Fernández openly questioned the reasons for which the War 
had happened. This ambiguity was part of her strategy. 
 
Cristina tried to detach the War from the negotiations regarding the sovereignty over the 
Islands. She tried to show that Argentinians themselves had been victims to the atrocities of 
the dictatorship so that her government and Argentina as a country could not be held 
responsible for the violent military take-over. She recognized that the War made their 
sovereignty claim worthless. And for criticasters who said they she reinvigorated the War 
with her renewed claim, she would reply that her way was the pacifistic way, the Gandhian 
way. She wanted to demilitarize the whole issue, which was also why she saw the military 
base on the Malvinas a big provocation.  
 
 45 
By making this a peaceful, diplomatic and a human-rights based sovereignty claim, she 
managed to receive a lot of support from developing countries from all over the world. 
Besides that, Cristina made this a regional issue. She would use all the regional fora to 
address the issue and to seek alliances. ‘Volveremos a Malvinas de manera America Latina’ 
became a known lemma of her government. Also she sought alliances with civil society 
organizations, even with UK-based NGO’s. Fundamental was the appointment of Alicia 
Castro as Argentinian ambassador to the UK. Castro, as syndicalist who served before as 
ambassador to Venezuela and had good connections with the Chávez regime. She found an 
ally in the person of Labour-leader Jeremy Corbyn. 
 
The Center for Malvinas Veterans (CECIM) in La Plata became the sounding board for 
Cristina’s government policies with respect to the Malvinas issue. CECIM is well-known for 
creating bonds with human rights organizations in Argentina, such as the Permanent 
Assembly for Human Rights (APDH), Servicio Paz y Justicia (SERPAJ), but most often with the 
Movimiento por la Paz, la Soberanía y la Solidaridad entre los Pueblos (Mopassol). With the 
latter, CECIM worked together to create an educative program that was meant to raise 
awareness among Argentinians about the consequences of the British occupation of the 
islands in the South Atlantic and what danger that brings about for the entire region. 
According to CECIM’s constitutional statute its primary goal is to: ‘Permanently defend the 
sovereign rights in the South Atlantic, Malvinas, Georgias and Sandwich del Sur from every 
dominion both colonial and imperialistic … and to permanently defend the human rights’ 
(Winer, 2013, p. 131). 
 
Besides from setting new objectives, Cristina and her government claimed that they just 
followed up on what national and international law obliged them to do. The current 
Argentinian Constitution states in one of its provisions: ‘The Argentine Nation ratifies its 
legitimate and imprescriptible sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Georgia and South 
Sandwich Islands and the corresponding maritime and insular spaces, as an integral part of 
the national territory.  
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The recovery of these territories and the full exercise of sovereignty, respecting the way of 
life of its inhabitants and in accordance with the principles of International Law, constitute a 
permanent and inalienable objective of the Argentine people.’ 10 
 
What principles of international law is the Argentinian Constitution referring to? Without 
getting into a juridical discussion, it is good to know on what historic and legal grounds the 
Argentinians base their claim on. First of all, from a historical perspective, the Argentinians 
claim that they occupied the Malvinas before they were usurped by the British in 1833. As 
can be read on the current official government website, the Spanish authorities first 
occupied the islands in 1765 and when Argentina became independent in the 1820s, the 
Malvinas automatically became part of the newly constituted Argentina. In June 1829, Luis 
Vernet was named Governor of the isles in the South Atlantic. Only four years later, the 
British Corvette ship Clio occupied the Malvinas making it part of the British Empire.11   
It is this piece of history that gives Argentinians reason to claim that the British are 
occupying their islands. However this history is disputable. At least the part where it says 
that the Spanish were the first to inhabit the Islands. There is no consensus among scholar 
about who discovered the Islands, but most of them agree that evidence favors Spanish, 
Portuguese or Dutch sailors, rather than the British. But it is fair to say that most of the 
historic research and writing regarding Malvinas has been done by Argentinian scholars 
(Laver, 2001, p. 20). This is only to mark the complexity on which historical claims are based. 
 
Legally, they are basing their rights on the UN resolution 2065 that was adopted by the 
General Assembly in 1965. This resolution, brought forward by the Fourth Committee 
(Decolonization Committee) of the United Nations, considers the 1514 resolution of 1960 
‘that was prompted by the cherished aim of bringing an end everywhere colonialism in all its 
forms one of which covers the case of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)’ (UN/RES/2065). 
 
 
 
10 https://www.argentina.gob.ar/ejercito/malvinas 
11 Ibidem. 
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The General Assembly also call on both governments to proceed with the negotiations as 
recommended by the Special Committee on the situation with regard to the implementation 
of the Declaration of Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples with a 
view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem. In the last sentence of the resolution the 
General Assembly asks to take the interests of the population of the Malvinas into account.  
The first part of this resolution and the reference to the 1514 resolution insinuates that the 
Malvinas dispute is a case of returning the right to self-determination. However, the British 
hold on to the last sentence in which the wishes of the inhabitants need to be taken into 
account. That is why they arranged an sovereignty referendum on the Malvinas in 2013. On 
a turnout of 92 percent, 99.8 percent voted to remain part of British territory. Guillermo 
Carmona, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Argentinian Chamber of 
Deputies responded to this outcome: ‘This has no value at all since Argentina rejects the 
possibility of self-determination for an implanted population, such as the implanted British 
population in the Malvinas.’12 And according to Daniel Filmus, this referendum was just a 
weak attempt to undermine the successes of Argentine diplomacy in all the international 
fora.13 
 
Concluding, Cristina Fernández was much more active and radical when it comes to claiming 
the sovereignty of the Malvinas. She institutionalized the claim by creating the Secretariat 
for Malvinas Affairs, appointing Daniel Filmus as Secretary, making CECIM La Plata the 
leading institute for Malvinas Veterans, by founding the Malvinas Museum, naming the 
syndicalist Alicia Castro ambassador to the UK, and by finding regional and human-rights 
based support, through continuous claims at the UN and around the globe. At the UN she 
annually made her claim known to the Decolonization Committee, referring to the UNGA 
resolution 2065. Cristina’s administration did not fall back after the British organized a 
referendum in 2014 on the Malvinas to show that the local population wanted to remain 
part of British territory. The Argentinians claim that the population was planted there. The 
historic claim that the British were the first settlers of the Islands is also disputed by all kinds 
of scholars, but most of them are Argentina based. 
 
12 https://en.mercopress.com/2012/06/13/falklands-referendum-has-no-value-and-does-
not-change-argentina-s-position 
13 Ibidem. 
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Conclusion 
 
Whilst writing this thesis, the Argentinians just elected Alberto Fernández as their new 
president. The neoliberal, conservative Mauricio Macri lost his re-election with 40 percent of 
the votes against 48 percent for Fernández, whereby Macri became the first incumbent 
Argentinian president to be defeated in his re-election bid. Alberto Fernández’s running-
mate is Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who now is back in power as vice-president of the 
Republic. She started the election period as a candidate for the presidency, but she decided 
to take one step back to make way for her former chief-of-staff Alberto Fernández. This 
tactic was designed to attract the key centrist voters who might have been afraid by the fiery 
leftist Cristina. Alberto is considered to be more moderate. When taking office, Fernández 
made a clear reference to the Malvinas issue: ‘We reaffirm our strongest commitment to 
honor the First Transitory Clause of the Argentine Constitution and we shall work tirelessly 
to boost the legitimate and imprescriptible sovereignty claim over the Malvinas, South 
Georgia and South Sandwich Islands and corresponding maritime and insular spaces... We 
shall do it knowing that the peoples of Latin America and the world are supporting us, and 
convinced that the only possible way is peace and diplomacy. We shall honor the memory of 
those who fell fighting for sovereignty. We shall work for the peaceful resolution of the 
disagreement and based on the dialogue proposed by the United Nations Resolution 
2065..There is no more room for colonialisms in the 21st century.’ With that, Fernández 
skillfully sums up some of the key characteristics of Cristina’s policy-making with respect to 
the Malvinas issue.  
 
From a theoretical perspective you might see why these three concepts that I have chosen 
are applicable to this specific claim. First of all: national sovereignty.  It is a recurrent theme 
in Latin American history and current politics. It has obviously a strong basis in the colonial 
history of the continent. At first it was the threat of renewed European interventions after 
independence and later it became the long arm of the United States that tried to keep 
control of their self-proclaimed backyard. In the case of the issue of the Malvinas, it is the 
British Empire that holds on to its strategic outposts that leads to an ongoing neocolonial 
sentiment of oppression among Argentinians.  
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That is one of the reasons why the Decolonization Committee of the UN still gathers every 
year, to give the Argentinians the right to put forward their sovereignty claim. As we have 
seen, Latin American countries build on a strong tradition of defensive multilateralism and 
regional cooperation. Nevertheless, Argentina’s foreign policies have been swinging from a 
neoliberalist thrive to fully opening up the market for foreign investments towards a leftist 
approach of protection of the national industry and building on regional partnerships. The 
latter also comes down to a sense of taking back control, which is a global characteristic of 
populism. It is a form of effective sovereigntism, as Kallis called it, that crosses conventional 
political lines and goes further than the regular political spheres or institutions. Creating an 
outside danger, for instance the so-called NATO base on the Malvinas, is used an antidote 
for an internal crises (for example the economic crisis in 2001 or the war with the 
agricultural sector in 2010) that reconstitutes popular sovereignty on the ‘inside’.  
 
The Kirchners match many of what political scientist have considered as characteristics of 
populism. Néstor Kirchner got elected in 2003 being an ‘outsider’ of the broken Argentinian 
political system that was facing a crisis of governability. Both Néstor and Cristina challenge 
the political elite on behalf of the ill-defined pueblo. When it comes to distinguishing them 
between the classical populists and neopopulists I would argue that they better fit the 
description of a classical populist because neopopulists like Menem and Fujimori are clearly 
different in the sense that they pursued neoliberal market reforms. What they have in 
common is that both need a strong personalistic and nationalistic leader.  Nationalism is a 
concept that is often associated with populism. The same counts for Kirchnerism. 
Nationalism has always been present in Latin American history, but Péron introduced a new 
kind that aimed at achieving a social revolution in the interest of the masses. This Peronist 
style influenced many nationalistic politicians in Argentina, including the Kirchners. But their 
kind of nationalism had another addition that was influenced by the commodities boom. 
Resource nationalism as they called it was directed at nationalizing the exploitation of the 
country’s resources. Resources that the British are stealing, in the minds of many 
Argentinians.  
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Resource nationalism combines many before-mentioned elements: As Koch and Perrault 
have stated, it is a geopolitical discourse about sovereignty, the state, and territory, as well 
as the rights and privileges of citizenship, national identity, and the values a group assigns to 
resources like oil, gas and minerals.  
 
Therefore, from a theoretical and political perspective, the issue of the Malvinas served 
many purposes for the Kirchners. In short, by reinvigorating the claim on the Malvinas, they 
caused a chain reaction of a national anti-colonial sentiment, creating an external threat, 
overcoming the crisis of governability, uniting the unorganized nationalistic masses and 
ultimately strengthening their populist powerbase.  
 
After the ‘fiesta menemista’ of the 1990s and the deep economic crisis in 2001 it was clear 
that Argentina needed radical change. Where Menem valued a good relationship with Great 
Britain for the sake of attracting British investors, the Kirchners were not restricted by the 
goal of making way for foreign businesses. Instead, they wanted to promote and favor their 
own national industries which had practically been dismantled under Menem. Resources, 
like oil and gas, are obviously important to feed the industry. Both can be found in the sea 
surrounding the Malvinas. Apart from the economic crisis in 2001, which gave Néstor 
Kirchner an opportunity to seize power, another important historic event was Néstor’s death 
in 2010. Since 2008, Cristina’s popularity had gone done because of corruption scandals and 
her feud with the agricultural sector. The death of her husband gave her renewed support 
which led to a remarkable re-election at the 2011 presidential elections. During her second-
term she became more radical in her foreign policies. She became more outspoken and 
more polarizing. It was either be with us or be against us.  
 
Besides of political ideology, there are also some more obvious reasons for which the 
Kirchners gave new life to the claim on the Malvinas. During the field research I conducted I 
have discovered what the Malvinas mean to the Argentinians in general, and to the 
Kirchners in particular. In 1982, The Kirchners waived the young soldiers goodbye from their 
hometown Río Gallegos where the ships departed to fight on the Malvinas. Their proximity 
to the War and the human right abuses that happened there, has probably been a strong 
motivation for their commitments with regards to the issue of the Malvinas.  
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The advocacy for human rights became part of their Malvinas strategy. They made a 
distinction between veterans who were part of the military regime and veterans who were 
forced to fight in the War. By portraying the latter group as victims of torture and abuse of 
the dictatorial regime, the Kirchners made themselves known as human right defenders for 
which they gained support from other human rights defenders and NGO’s worldwide. Also 
they distanced themselves from the militaristic way of solving the Malvinas dispute. Cristina 
recognized the fact that the War had been the biggest set-back in the history of their 
sovereignty claim. She pursued the peaceful, Gandhian and diplomatic way, by which she 
also gained regional support of several other Latin American countries and regional 
organizations who understood their struggle with imperialist powers. Cristina’s 
administration made CECIM La Plata the leading institute and sounding board for the 
Malvinas claim. 
 
As is common for populists, the Kirchners follow on a widespread national sentiment that 
the Argentine nation is ‘amputated’ (la nación amputada) or that they lost a younger sister 
(la hermanita perdida). Both of these phrases I have heard when talking to ‘normal’ 
Argentinians, who did not see themselves as Kirchnerists. I have also ascertained that it was 
mainly Cristina who made the renewed Argentinian claim widely known. She build on the 
before-mentioned sentiments in which the British occupied their Islands and that they are 
stealing their natural resources. Also the presence of British armed and naval forces feeds 
into the argument that Argentina is facing an external threat.  
 
On top of that, there is a link to be found in the radicalization of Cristina’s policies in her 
second-term and the start of British oil drilling in the South West Atlantic from 2010 and 
onwards. The story of the hydrocarbon explorations exemplifies the changing diplomatic ties 
between the two countries. By signing a Joint Declaration in 1995 Menem sought 
cooperation with the British government to work together to find petroleum and gas in the 
ocean. Cristina broke that partnership in her first year as president, after which the British 
found possibilities to drill the petroleum. This development infuriated the Argentinians, who 
saw the Kelpers doubling their revenues. They had already become wealthy by selling fishing 
licenses in their self-proclaimed EEZ. The Falkland Island Outer Conservation Zone as they 
call it was drawn by Thatcher at the beginning of the 1990s.  
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She decided that the Falklanders had the right to sell the fishing licenses to foreign 
companies, from all over the world. Therefore the Argentinians have to endure the sight of 
Korean fishing vessels extracting costly squid from waters that they consider to be theirs. 
Finally, the Malvinas serve as a gateway to Antarctica. Argentina and the UK have an 
overlapping claim on a part of the South Pole. The UK base their claim on the territorial 
presence in the islands in the South Atlantic.  
 
And most basically, the Malvinas dispute is also a consequence of uncertainty over who 
occupied the islands first. Even though the Kirchners were masters of rewriting history, there 
is no evidence that the British were the first inhabitants of the Malvinas. If we were ought to 
believe Argentinian scholars it is most likely that Spanish settlers were there before the 
British, after which it was part of Argentina for four years at the beginning of the 19th 
century. Was it clear though, is that the British ship Clio claimed the Islands in the 1830s 
making it part of the British Empire. It has been British territory ever since, with the 
exemption of a few weeks in 1982.  
 
With Cristina Fernández back in power and Brexit underway, it is my prediction that the 
Malvinas issue is going to face a new chapter. The Kirchnerists saw new possibilities arising 
from the upcoming Brexit. The peaceful claim shall be brought forward with more pressure 
than before. The Fernández-Fernández administration will undo all the steps of 
rapprochement with the UK that happened during Macri’s years in office. The Argentinians 
may work together with their former colonizer Spain, who is simultaneously claiming 
Gibraltar after the UK left their Union. In any case, it does not seem like the dispute will be 
resolved any time soon.  
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